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him, perhaps no less than letting him slip, has the potential of fulfil-
ling Antony's prophesy. 
THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTER-
PRETATION. By Charles A. Lofgren.' New York, N.Y.: 
Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. vi, 269. $29.95. 
Richard E. Morgan 2 
Plessy v. Ferguson remains a bone in the throat of American 
constitutional law, thirty-five years after its supposed demise in 
Brown v. Board of Education. This new book by Professor Charles 
A. Lofgren helps us to understand why. The continuing problem 
with Plessy results from the intellectual weakness of Brown. By fail-
ing to mount a frontal and decisive attack on Plessy, Chief Justice 
Warren's opinion in Brown left open the door to the mischievous 
ambiguity in equal protection analysis which continues to plague 
us.3 While we know that Jim Crow was judicially dismantled on 
the authority of Brown, that case did not cleanly overrule Plessy, but 
held that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate 
but equal' has no place."4 And as Professor Lofgren remarks: "As 
of mid-1986, Shepard's Citations, the standard 'finding aid' used by 
lawyers to trace subsequent judicial treatment of decisions, listed no 
case as having overruled Plessy." As early as 1955 Edmund Cahn, a 
wholehearted supporter of the outcome in Brown, regretted that the 
decision appeared grounded in the shifting sands of social science, 
and that it failed to end discrimination on the basis of a clear, con-
stitutional principle.s 
I. Roy P. Crocker Professor of American Politics and History at Claremont Mc-
Kenna College. 
2. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Constitutional Law and Government at 
Bowdoin College. 
3. When if ever are race-conscious remedies licit? Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg 
Board of Education, 402 U.S. I (1971), answered the question in the affirmative as regards 
racial assignment of pupils to schools to achieve that degree of racial balance the Justices held 
required as the remedy for a district's having maintained a dual school system in the past. In 
other contexts doctrine governing "affirmative action" is vaguely contoured and the Court 
deeply divided. See United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987); Local Number 93, 
International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986); Local 28 
Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion, 476 U.S. 267 (1986). And if Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 
107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987) (a Title VII decision holding that a marginally less qualified female 
may be promoted over a male in the absence of a history of past purposeful discrimination) 
has implications for racial affirmative action, the confusion becomes coruscant. 
4. 347 u.s. 483, 495 (1954). 
5. See Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1955). 
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Ironically, Brown was decided the way it was because so many 
of the participants were convinced that as a matter of traditional 
constitutional interpretation Plessy was unassailable.6 They recog-
nized that the generation that framed and ratified the fourteenth 
amendment had countenanced separation of the races in public fa-
cilities, including schools, and had not thought that the equal pro-
tection clause forbade the states from engaging in this kind of racial 
discrimination. Furthermore, they concluded that this "original in-
tention" had been worked into the fabric of American law over the 
course of half a century, and there was no way within the ground 
rules of conventional constitutional argument and conceptions of 
the judicial role that Plessy could be attacked. The only way to get 
the desired result was to stress essentially nonconstitutional argu-
ments, to engage in what we would call today a "noninterpretive" 
construction of the Constitution. 
This view of Brown, which sees the opinion as necessarily 
noninterpretive, still commands respect. Those law professors who 
disparage interpretivism (or "originalism," as it is sometimes called) 
often observe that its inadequacy is conclusively demonstrated by 
its inability to justify the result in Brown. 7 
What Lofgren helps us to see is that the legal architects of the 
mid-1950s (and the constitutional theorists of the late-1980s) got it 
wrong-wrong in a way that will breed increasing strife until the 
error is corrected. For what was called for in Linda Brown's suit 
was not a flight from history, not a turning away from the framers 
of the fourteenth amendment. What was needed was an opinion 
that, while acknowledging that it was announcing new law which 
went beyond the consensus of 1866 -1868, made it clear that the new 
rule ("no discrimination on grounds of race") had very respectable 
6. Professor Alfred H. Kelly, who was an NAACP consultant in connection with 
Brown, was later quoted to the effect that he was faced with "the deadly opposition between 
my professional integrity ... and my wishes and hopes with respect to a contemporary ques-
tion of values, of ideals, of policy, of partisanship, and of political objectives. . . . The prob-
lem we faced was ... the formulation of an adequate gloss on the fateful events of I 866 
sufficient to convince the Court that we had something of a historical case. . . . It is not that 
we were engaged in formulating lies; there was nothing as crude and naive as that. But we 
were using facts, emphasizing facts, bearing down on facts, sliding off facts, quietly ignoring 
facts, and above all interpreting facts in a way to do what [Thurgood] Marshall said we had 
to do--'get by those boys down there.'" Quoted in W. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: 
THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS 510 (1973). In fact, an historical argument was, finally, in-
cluded in the plaintiff's brief, but it was neither very seriously offered, nor stressed by lead 
counsel. It was apparently ignored by the Court. That was too bad. The Justices could not 
have adopted Kelly's argument (it was, after all, wrong) but they might have built on it. 
7. The locus classicus of this argument is M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE 
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 66-70 (1982), but it has become commonplace. See Seidman, 
Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of 
Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1049 (1987). 
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historical antecedents. What was needed was an explanation that, 
in the light of five decades of experience with "separate but equal," 
the new rule was necessary in order to validate the primary pur-
poses of the amendment. Walter Berns has recently reminded us 
that, far from contributing to the legitimacy of the outcome or pro-
tecting the Court against the inevitable charge that it was usurping 
the legislative role, "nothing in the Court's opinion could persuade 
[critics] that the decision was rooted in, or issued from, the Consti-
tution.s A clear constitutional statement could have fared no worse 
in the short run, and would have served much better in the end. 
It is always easy to second guess busy men, who were about 
great works, in a political and intellectual climate different from our 
own. But in hindsight one may surely be permitted to wonder why 
it was that those involved in the Brown drama were so intimidated 
by Plessy as precedent even while wishing it away with every fiber of 
their beings.9 After all, there had been a famous dissent in Plessy-
Justice John Marshall Harlan had attacked state-mandated racial 
discrimination in terms that rarely have been surpassed for elo-
quence. Harlan wrote: 
In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United 
States does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those 
entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights. 
"Our Constitution is color-blind," Harlan continued. And he con-
cluded prophetically: 
State enactments, regulating the enjoyment of civil rights, upon the basis of race, ... 
under the pretense of recognizing equality of rights, can have no other result than to 
render permanent peace impossible, and to keep alive a conflict of races, the contin-
uance of which must do harm to all concerned. 
By the 1950s, there were adequate models in American consti-
tutional practice for relying on famous dissents to undermine rules 
of law which critics believed mistaken. One thinks of the eventual 
8. Berns, Government by Lawyers and Judges, 83 CoMMENTARY 17, 20 (1987). 
9. SeeR. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 543-81 (1975). The NAACP lawyers did, in fact, 
call for Plessy to be overruled, and had done so as early as Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 
(1950). Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 
1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. I, 4 (1979). But they did not attack hard on the point, and the 
attempt to put forward a principled alternative to Plessy was halfhearted. See R. BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 117-33 (1977). In any case the Justices apparently despaired 
of finding traditional arguments against Plessy. This question of the vigor of the attack on 
Plessy has surfaced again in an exchange between Randall Kennedy and Philip Elman, 
prompted by the publication in the Harvard Law Review of Elman's memoir of his role in 
Brown. Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 
1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1987); Kennedy, A Reply to Philip 
Elman, !00 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1987); Elman, Response, !00 HARV. L. REV. 1949 (1987). 
Elman has by far the better of this argument. 
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triumph of "clear and present danger" over "bad tendency," 10 and 
of the eventual vindicationtt of Justice Holmes's dissent in Lochner 
v. New York.12 Couldn't Harlan's Plessy dissent have served as a 
base for a frontal intellectual assault on that case and its progeny? 
The answer is that however moved opponents of segregation 
may have been by the rhetoric of Harlan's dissent, they thought its 
reasoning (which, as Lofgren points out, drew heavily on Albion 
Tourgee's brief for Homer Plessy) was bad. Besides, Harlan did not 
have the towering reputation of Holmes or Brandeis. He had taken 
a number of constitutional positions which by the 1950s had come 
to be regarded as indefensible13-indeed, Harlan was the one 
"eccentric exception" to which Justice Frankfurter referred in his 
attack on Justice Black's argument for the historical incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause in Adamson v. Cali-
fornia. But did Harlan's Plessy effort really deserve its poor 
reputation? 
Harlan was certainly wrong about how the generation which 
framed and ratified the fourteenth amendment defined "civil 
rights." In order to get hold of this, it is necessary to grasp the 
distinction, which was as natural to that generation as the air it 
breathed, between civil rights, political rights, and social rights and 
duties. Hear, for instance, Justice Field, dissenting in Ex parte Vir-
ginia, arguing that section one of the fourteenth amendment left 
"political rights, or such [rights] as arise from the form of govern-
ment and its administration, as they stood previous to its adoption." 
The fourteenth amendment, Field wrote, "has no more reference to 
them [political rights, such as voting] than it has to social rights and 
duties, which do not rest upon any positive law, though they are 
more potential in controlling the intercourse of individuals."t4 Just 
as voting, a "political right," was not within the compass of section 
one, so most of the framers and ratifiers considered state-enforced 
racial separation to fall into the sphere of "social rights and duties," 
not civil rights. The paradigmatic civil rights were enumerated in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866: owning property, entering into legally 
enforceable contracts, having access to the courts to sue, and so on. 
On this, Raoul Berger is certainly correct.ts 
10. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). 
II. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
12. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905). 
13. Most prominently, Harlan maintained that the fourteenth amendment nationalized 
the Bill of Rights, and that inns and similar places of public accommodation were sufficiently 
"public sector" in character as to be covered by the fourteenth amendment. Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26-62 (1883). 
14. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 367-68 (1879). 
15. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 119-21 (1977). 
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Granting all this, several things can be said for Harlan. First, 
he had the framers' general approach right. With respect to what 
they conceived to be civil rights, the supporters of the fourteenth 
amendment were clear about what was intended. It was that black 
men and white men should stand on an equal footing. What was 
intended, in other words, was that the law be color blind with re-
spect to its subjects. 
Second, while most of those who focused on section one during 
the framing debate and ratification probably thought it left the 
states free to classify by race, not everyone did. Others, as Lofgren 
notes, formed "a general impression ... that negroes would ... be 
admitted on the same terms and conditions as white people, to 
schools, theaters, hotels, churches, railway cars, steamboats, etc." 
Third, Harlan was able to use (and very adroitly) an earlier 
interpretation of section one, namely Justice William Strong's opin-
ion for the Court in Strauder v. West Virginia. Strong, in 1880, 
appears to have understood clearly what the framers of the four-
teenth amendment had not perceived: that political and social dis-
criminations based on race would inevitably undercut any 
guarantees of equality. Thus Harlan, quoting Strong: 
The words of the [fourteenth) amendment ... contain a necessary implication of a 
positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race-the right to exemp-
tion from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored-exemption 
from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the secur-
ity of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which 
are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race. 
Fourth, Harlan's dissent embodies that clear constitutional ba-
sis for decision that was tragically missing in Brown. Harlan was 
wrong about the specific intentions of the generation which framed 
the fourteenth amendment. But it surely could have been argued 
that by the mid-twentieth century it was painfully apparent that 
enforced racial separation fatally undercut those civil rights which 
the framers had sought to protect. To have written such an opinion 
in Brown would certainly have been to announce "new law for a 
new day," but it would not have been "noninterpretive" review. 
Harlan's "color-blind Constitution" yields a neutral principle of 
constitutional law, and one which is rooted in a value the Constitu-
tion denominates as special. 
This is the heart of the matter. As Lofgren puts it, the opinion 
in Brown "did not reject reliance on racial 'facts,' a central if not 
entirely explicit feature of Justice Brown's reasoning in Plessy." 
More important, the Court did not "wholeheartedly embrace Jus-
tice Harlan's color-blind Constitution." In fact, 
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Chief Justice Warren used an argument structurally similar to the one that Justice 
Brown had used in upholding Louisiana's conclusion that separation promoted the 
public's welfare. Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at 
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, Warren held, the trial court's factual finding [in 
Brown] was amply supported by modern authority, a statement he [Warren) then 
documented through his soon-controversial Footnote Eleven, which cited seven 
studies by social scientists. In 1896, it is true, the Court had deferred to legislative 
judgment about "facts" of race, while in 1954 it deferred to a lower court's judg-
ment, but in each instance conclusions about such "facts" entered into the reason-
ing. The Chief Justice himself saw his social science authorities as important 
because they rebutted Justice Brown's social science. 
Let us be clear. The principle of no-discrimination (Justice 
Harlan's "color-blind Constitution") has three advantages over the 
social engineering approach adopted by Warren. First, an historical 
argument can be made in support of it-not quite the one Harlan 
himself made, but a plausible one. More important, no-discrimina-
tion (no governmental use of race as a category for classifying peo-
ple) is a neutral legal principle; that is, it is the kind of basis of 
decision which provides guidance for the future and which gives the 
quality of law (and thus legitimacy) to the Court's decisions. Most 
important, a decision on the basis of a no-discrimination principle 
would have removed the equal protection clause from the shifting 
tides of fashionable opinion about which government policies will or 
will not lead to better race relations. 
THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN. 
By Joseph Vining.1 Chicago, 11.: University of Chicago Press. 
1986. Pp. XX, 268. $25.00. 
Stanley C Brubaker 2 
Beginning with a poem, ending with a poem, and covering such 
topics as "MIND," "NATURE," "AUTHENTICITY," "TIME," 
and "FAITH," Professor Joseph Vining wishes to lay bare the 
"lawyer's dilemma" and its resulting "pain." The dilemma, the 
reader quickly discovers, does not concern insider trading, and the 
pain is not from reaching one's quota of billable hours. His book 
identifies the lawyer's dilemma with the fundamental choices of life 
and death, hope and despair. Its approach is more evocative than 
analytic, its form more rumination than argument, and its diction 
more metaphoric than literal. It thus defies and mocks attempts 
I. Harry Burns Hutchins Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
2. Associate Professor of Political Science, Colgate University. 
